Unemployment, the Market for Interviews, and Wage Determination
构建了一个均衡失业与职位空缺模型，指出面试市场缺失会导致外部性和低效率，并分析市场力量如何通过面试费或工资调整来应对，以及工资如何随供给、税收和转移支付变化。
A model of equilibrium unemployment and vacancies is presented in which the absence of a market for interviews can yield externalities and inefficiency. Inefficiency results in market forces that lead firms to charge fees for interviews or to change the wage rate. These market forces require substantial information and may not operate. A graphical analysis shows how such forces would cause wages to adjust to shifts in supply, taxes, and transfers between workers and firms. With excessive unemployment, efficiency requires a transfer of income from workers to firms. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.