How Financial Incentives Induce Disability Insurance Recipients to Return to Work
利用挪威残疾保险政策中的断点随机实验，研究经济激励如何有效促使受益人重返工作，发现许多人有工作潜力且激励可增加其可支配收入并降低项目成本。
Using a local randomized experiment that arises from a sharp discontinuity in Disability Insurance (DI) policy in Norway, we provide transparent and credible identification of how financial incentives induce DI recipients to return to work. We find that many DI recipients have considerable capacity to work that can be effectively induced by providing financial work incentives. We further show that providing work incentives to DI recipients may both increase their disposable income and reduce program costs. Our findings also suggest that targeted policies may be the most effective in encouraging DI recipients to return to work.