The Welfare Effects of Use-or-Lose Provisions in Markets with Dominant Firms
研究了监管机构在航空和无线通信等行业使用的“用或失去”条款，要求企业使用一定比例产能，发现该条款对总产出和福利的影响取决于主导企业与边缘企业的效率差异。
A use-or-lose provision requires that firms employ a certain minimum fraction of their productive capacity. Variants have been used by regulators in the airline and wireless communications industries, among others. A typical stated objective is to limit capacity hoarding, thereby increasing aggregate output and welfare. When the dominant firm is more efficient than fringe firms, we find that imposing a use-or-lose provision induces the dominant firm to acquire capacity from the fringe, which causes aggregate output to fall. When the dominant firm is less efficient than the fringe, aggregate output rises. In both cases, total surplus may rise or fall.