Tournaments, Fairness, and Risk
通过实验估计被试在锦标赛合同和固定绩效合同下的支付意愿，发现公平偏好和风险厌恶会降低对锦标赛合同的偏好，为理解农户对锦标赛薪酬的不满提供了新解释。
We estimate willingness to pay (WTP) to operate under two types of contracts—tournaments (Ts) and fixed performance‐standard contracts (F). Our results are consistent with the notion that subjects having social preferences for fairness and care about risk. That is, when subjects experience greater inequity under tournaments relative to fixed performance contracts, or experience greater revenue risk under tournaments, the gap between WTP for fixed performance and tournament contracts increases, ceteris paribus . Our results provide an explanation for grower dissatisfaction with tournament compensation schemes independent of possible concerns regarding opportunistic behavior by integrators.