Decision-Making Procedures for Committees of Careerist Experts
研究由有职业顾虑的专家组成的委员会，在透明与秘密两种决策程序下，哪种更能有效汇总信息、避免扭曲决策，对理解政治透明度的利弊有参考价值。
The call for "more transparency " is voiced nowadays by politicians and pundits alike, as a solution to almost any failure of the political system. Proponents of transparency emphasize its bene…ts such as enhanced accounability, enhanced predictability, and the provision of expert information to the economy. Both political scientists and economists noted however that, in the presence of career or reputation concerns, transparency may yield ine ¢ cient decisions as decision makers will not necessarily state their private views in public, thereby distorting the process of information aggregation. In this paper I consider the optimality of transparency of committees. 1 I build on a model of committees composed of experts who have career concerns, provided in Levy (forthcoming). When the decision making procedure in a committee is transparent, outsiders can observe the individual votes of the experts, whereas when it is secretive, only its …nal decision is known to outsiders. As I emphasize in Levy (forthcoming), whether committees should be transparent or secretive cannot be analyzed