Preferences for Collective Versus Individualised Wage Setting
构建模型内生化工资刚性和集体谈判覆盖率，发现当工人技能可观察时，相当比例的工人、企业和中位选民偏好集体谈判，且分离决策的扭曲（如解雇税）是这种偏好产生的必要条件。
Standard models of equilibrium unemployment assume exogenous labour market institutions and flexible wage determination. This article models wage rigidity and the coverage of collective bargaining endogenously, when workers differ by observable skill and may adopt either individualised or collective wage bargaining. In the calibrated model, a substantial fraction of workers and firms as well as the median voter prefer collective bargaining to the decentralised regime. A fundamental distortion of the separation decision in the form of a firing tax is necessary for these preferences to emerge. Endogenous coverage of collective bargaining can significantly modify the model's comparative statics predictions. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.