Information Management in Incentive Problems
扩展了标准采购模型，研究如何激励代理人获取有价值的规划信息，并分析信息获取对激励合同的影响，发现极端报酬结构和成本分担合同，但将规划与生产任务分离可消除合同扭曲。
The authors extend the standard procurement model to examine how an agent is optimally induced to acquire valuable planning information before he chooses an unobservable level of cost-reducing effort. Information acquisition concerns cause important changes in standard incentive contracts. Reward structures with extreme financial payoffs arise and super-high-powered contracts are coupled with contracts that entail pronounced cost sharing. However, if the principal can assign the planning and production tasks to two different agents, then all contracting distortions disappear and, except for forgone economies of scope, the principal achieves her most preferred outcome. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.