Is Innovativeness a Link between Pay and Performance?
研究企业创新性如何影响高管薪酬与公司绩效的敏感度，发现创新带来的绩效波动效应在多数情况下超过生产率效应，导致两者呈反向关系。
The relationship between innovativeness and pay‐performance sensitivity is theoretically ambiguous because innovative activities simultaneously enhance the productivity of executives in creating shareholder value (productivity effect) and increase the volatility of the firm's performance (volatility effect). The empirical findings from the pooled sample suggest that innovativeness and executive pay‐performance sensitivity are inversely related. The extent to which the volatility effect outweighed the productivity effect was especially pronounced during the 2000‐2003 market crash period. While the productivity effect is stronger than the volatility effect in both the CEO and low‐free‐cash‐flow subsamples, the volatility effect is stronger than the productivity effect in both the non‐CEO and high‐free‐cash‐flow subsamples.