Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History: A Re-examination
通过改变信息呈现方式和加入策略推理提示，重复了Berg等人1995年的信任投资实验，发现信任行为并未减少，表明原始结果具有稳健性。
Abstract Berg et al. (Games and Economic Behavior, 10, pp. 122-142, 1995) study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting. They find significant amounts of trust and reciprocity and conclude that trust is a guiding behavioral instinct (a “primitive” in their terminology). We modify the way information is presented to participants and, through a questionnaire, prompt strategic reasoning. To our surprise, none of our various treatments led to a reduction in the amount invested. Previously reported experimental results to the contrary did not survive replication. Our results suggest that those by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe are rather robust to changes in information presentation and strategic reasoning prompts. We discuss the implications of these findings.