Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market
指出，在存在摩擦的劳动力市场中，通用培训的生产率收益会被未来雇主获取，导致培训投资不足，且雇主可能承担部分成本；培训与创新的相互作用会放大这种低效并导致多重均衡。
This paper shows that in a frictional labour market part of the productivity gains from general training will be captured by future employers. As a result, investments in general skills will be suboptimally low, and contrary to the standard theory, part of the costs may be borne by the employers. The paper also demonstrates that the interaction between innovation and training leads to an amplification of this inefficiency and to a multiplicity of equilibria. Workers are more willing to invest in their skills by accepting lower wages today if they expect more firms to innovate and pay them higher wages in the future. Similarly, firms are more willing to innovate when they expect the quality of the future workforce to be higher, thus when workers invest more in their skills.