Testing for Fairness in Regulation: Application to the Delhi Transportation Market
研究发现，德里自动人力车市场的监管机构在不知晓Rabin公平公理的情况下，其制定的法定票价却始终满足该公理，且新票价上调能在一段时间内促成统一价格。
I report a remarkable finding, that regulatory authorities, who have no a priori knowledge of Rabin’s 1993 fairness axioms (associated with a very specific utility function), have always proposed legal fares in the auto-rickshaw (three-wheeler) market in New Delhi that satisfy them. Regulated fares are ignored by auto–rickshaw drivers and customers. They bargain on prices among themselves. Newly announced fare hikes are effective enough to ensure the prevalence of legal uniform (non-negotiated) prices for a considerable amount of time. I suggest that the two of the most recent hikes have satisfied Rabin’s fairness axioms. The results, I report, are robust to different cooperative games of bargaining.