Financial Innovation, Macroeconomic Stability and Systemic Crises
构建了一个包含金融约束和状态依存合约的中介一般均衡模型，揭示资产贱卖的外部性如何在信贷扩张时引发自我实现的系统性金融危机，并指出金融创新和宏观经济稳定可能使发达国家金融危机更罕见但更严重。
We present a general equilibrium model of intermediation designed to capture some of the key features of the modern financial system. The model incorporates financial constraints and state-contingent contracts, and contains a clearly defined pecuniary externality associated with asset fire sales during periods of stress. If a sufficiently severe shock occurs during a credit expansion, this externality is capable of generating a systemic financial crisis that may be self-fulfilling. Our model suggests that financial innovation and greater macroeconomic stability may have made financial crises in developed countries less likely than in the past but potentially more severe.