Conversation with secrets
研究当一方拥有影响收益分配的私人信息时，对话能否持续。秘密持有者可能提前披露秘密以避免对话被终止，而非持有者则会终止对话，竞争和有限效果会加剧这一现象。
We analyze the sustainability of a conversation when one agent might be endowed with a piece of private information that affects the payoff distribution to its benefit. Such a secret can compromise the sustainability of conversation. Even without an obligation, the secret holder will disclose its secret if it prevents preemptive termination of the conversation. The nonsecret holder lacks this possibility and stops the conversation. Competition and limited effectiveness of the conversation amplify this result of early disclosure and render the conversation process less sustainable. We discuss policy and managerial implications for industry standard development and joint ventures.