Some Evidence on the Empirical Significance of Credit Rationing
利用1977至1988年间超过一百万笔商业银行贷款的详细合同信息，检验了信贷配给理论。发现贷款利率粘性与理论预测不符，且承诺贷款比例在信贷紧缩时未显著增加，表明均衡配给并非重要的宏观经济现象。
This paper examines the credit rationing debate using detailed contract information on over one million commercial bank loans from 1977 to 1988. While commercial loan rates are "sticky, " consistent with rationing, this stickiness varies with loan contract terms in ways that are not predicted by equilibrium credit rationing theory. In addition, the proportion of new loans issued under commitment does not increase significantly when credit markets are tight, despite the fact that borrowers without commitments can be rationed whereas commitment borrowers are contractually insulated from rationing. Overall, the data suggest that equilibrium rationing is not a significant macroeconomic phenomenon. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.