The Effectiveness of Antidumping Measures: Some Evidence for Farmed Atlantic Salmon
通过模拟世界鲑鱼市场的局部均衡模型，发现欧盟对挪威、智利和法罗群岛鲑鱼征收的保障关税更多惩罚了出口国生产者而非奖励英国生产者，原因在于出口供给弹性小于进口需求弹性。
Abstract Counterfactual simulations of a partial equilibrium model of the world salmon market suggest safeguard tariffs imposed by the European Commission on salmon imports from Norway, Chile, and the Faroe Islands would do more to punish producers in the named exporting countries than to reward United Kingdom producers. The reason is that export supply is less elastic than import demand on a bilateral basis, which means that most of the tariff's incidence is borne by the targeted producers rather than EU consumers. The incidence problem is exacerbated by the feed quota (now biomass limit) that Norway uses to limit its production. A marketing fee that expands market demand is shown to be less distortionary than its tariff equivalent, and thus may be preferred from a second‐best perspective.