The Demand for Monitoring Technologies: The Case of Trucking
研究卡车运输行业对车载电脑监控的需求，区分其激励改进和资源分配改进功能，发现监控的激励效益在司机偏好额外福利、司机努力重要且需向保险公司验证时较高，而资源分配效益在管理决策受限较少时更突出。
This paper examines the demand for on-board computers in trucking, distinguishing between their incentive- and resource-allocation-improving capabilities. I find that monitoring's incentive benefits are high when perquisite-taking is attractive to drivers, driver effort is important, and verifying drivers' actions to insurers is valuable. These results are consistent with agency theory and suggest that networking applications will raise the productivity and pay of difficult-toevaluate workers. I also find that monitoring's benefits are disproportionately resource-allocation-related when managerial decisions are least constrained. This suggests that networking applications' monitoring capabilities raise the returns to delegation when resource allocation decisions are routine and lower them when they are not.