Stability in the Absence of Deposit Insurance: The Canadian Banking System, 1890-1966
利用新档案数据，反驳了加拿大1967年前银行稳定源于大银行隐性存款保险的说法，指出无保险激励了审慎经营和监管，且无单位银行限制促进了高效合并，从而维持了稳定。
The Canadian banking system experienced a prolonged period of stability prior to the introduction of deposit insurance in 1967. Documenting the reasons for this stability provides important evidence in the debate over the impact of mandatory flat-rate deposit insurance. In this paper we use new archival data to refute recent claims that this stability resulted from an implicit deposit insurance scheme managed by Canada's largest banks and guaranteed by the federal government. We argue that the Canadian banking system was stable for two reasons. First, the absence of deposit insurance provided incentives for both prudence on the part of management, and monitoring by depositors and regulators. Second, the absence of unit banking and other regulatory barriers to competition facilitated efficient mergers which produced a relatively small number of well-managed banks. Copyright 1995 by Ohio State University Press.