Informative Advertising and Competition: A Noncooperative Approach
在古诺-瓦尔拉斯不完全竞争一般均衡模型中研究信息性广告的性质，发现当经济中代理人数量足够多时，个体最优广告支出为零，即近似竞争经济中不会出现信息性广告现象。
The properties of informative advertising are studied in the context of an imperfectly competitive general equilibrium model of the Cournot-Walras type. Competitive conditions are recreated using the "replication technique." It is shown that individually optimal advertising expenditures are zero if the number of agents is large enough in the economy. In other words, even in approximately competitive economies, the informative advertising phenomenon cannot be observed. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.