Adverse Selection as a Barrier to Entry in the Banking Industry
分析银行放贷时因信息不对称产生的逆向选择问题，指出新进入银行无法区分新借款人和被原银行拒绝的借款人，从而形成进入壁垒，并证明在伯特兰竞争下第三家银行无法进入市场。
Banks offering credit to borrowers are faced with uncertainty about their creditworthiness. If banks obtain information about borrowers after lending to them, they are able to reject riskier borrowers when refinancing. Potential entrant banks will face an adverse-selection problem stemming from their inability to distinguish new borrowers from old borrowers who have been rejected by their previous bank. We analyze the effects of asymmetric information on the market structure of the banking industry. We characterize the equilibrium under Bertrand competition with two banks, and show than an equilibrium where a third bank enters does not exist (blockaded entry).