Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability
研究有限理性玩家在对称博弈中通过实验和模仿两种简单规则进行学习，证明其随机过程全局收敛到均衡邻域，但局部行为依赖于模型细节。
Do boundedly rational agents repeatedly playing a symmetric game with a unique symmetric equilibrium learn over time to play it? In this paper we model the dynamic interaction of two types of such agents, experimenters and imitators, whose behavior is characterized by simple rules of thumb. We find that the stochastic process describing their play isstable in the large: it converges globally and with probability one to a compact neighborhood of the equilibrium. However, its local behavior near the equilibrium depends in interesting ways on the details of the model.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: D83.