移民的政治经济学

On the political economy of immigration

European Economic Review · 1996
被引 284 · 同刊同年前 10%
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

研究当本地居民财富不同且投票追求收入最大化时,多数投票如何决定对移民的资本和技能要求,发现本地人会分裂成两派:一派想最大化国内资本劳动比,另一派想最小化它。

Abstract

The authors "study how immigration policies that impose capital and skill requirements would be determined under majority voting when native agents differ in their wealth holdings and vote to maximize their income". The results of the model calculations indicate that "the native population will be polarized between those who would like an immigration policy to maximize the domestic capital-labor ratio and those who would like an immigration policy that would minimize it".

移民政策资本劳动比多数投票财富异质性