Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
提出一种针对可排他公共产品的成本分摊机制，该机制满足策略证明、匿名和自愿参与，且优于保守均摊机制，能缓解搭便车问题。
Under the "Conservative Equal costs" mechanism to produce a non-excludable (one-dimensional) public good, each agent reports his demand. The lowest reported demand of public good is produced and its cost is shared equally among all agents. When the cost of producing the public good is convex, this mechanism is strategy-proof (even with respect to coalitions), anonymous and induces voluntary participation. No other mechanism shares these three properties. When the public good is excludable (its cost still convex), there is a mechanism with the same properties, that everyone prefers to conservative equal costs. This mechanism excludes the agent with the lowest (equal costs) demand from consuming (or paying for) a larger amount of the good, ameliorating the free-rider problem.