SEARCH DIRECTION AND WAGE DISPERSION*
在定向搜索模型中允许失业者和空缺职位选择发送或接收工资报价，从而决定市场结构。研究发现存在多个均衡但只有一个演化稳定均衡，该均衡下工资离散出现，且当失业-空缺比接近1时稳定均衡包含两个搜索方向相反的子市场，否则由市场长边发送报价。
In a directed search model, we allow the unemployed and the vacancies to choose whether to send or receive wage offers. This determines the market structure. There are several equilibria but a unique evolutionary stable one. Wage offers are made under incomplete information about the number of offers, and the equilibrium strategies involve mixing. This results in wage dispersion. We show that if the unemployment–vacancy ratio is close to unity, the stable equilibrium consists of two submarkets with opposite search directions. Otherwise, the long side of the market sends offers. The stable equilibrium is efficient, given the frictions.