The Possibility of Social Choice
探讨社会选择理论面临的挑战与基础问题，指出投票程序在某些社会选择问题中适用但在其他问题中不适用，并反驳了阿罗不可能定理等结论对理性民主社会选择具有破坏性的观点。
The subject of social choice includes within its capacious frame various problems with the common feature of relating social judgments and group decisions to the views and interests of the individuals who make up the society or the group. Some challenges and foundational problems faced by social choice theory as a discipline are discussed. Social choice theory is a subject in which formal and mathematical techniques have been very extensively used. Voting-based procedures are entirely natural for some kinds of social choice problems, such as elections, referendums, or committee decisions. They are, however, altogether unsuitable for many other problems of social choice. Impossibility results in social choice theory - led by the pioneering work of Arrow (1951) - have often been interpreted as being thoroughly destructive of the possibility of reasoned and democratic social choice, including welfare economics. That view is argued against.