Truthful Bundle/Multiunit Double Auctions
提出一种“填充”方法，通过引入无限预算的虚拟买家来人为制造供需不平衡，从而设计出首个同时满足策略证明、个体理性、预算平衡和渐近效率的双向拍卖机制，适用于多买家多卖家且买家需求多种商品捆绑、卖家供应多单位单一商品的市场。
We address the mechanism design problem for a market with multiple buyers and sellers. Each buyer demands some bundle(s) of various commodities, and each seller supplies multiple units of one commodity. To design truthful double-auction mechanisms, we propose a novel “padding” method that intentionally creates imbalances between the supply availability and demand requirement by introducing a phantom buyer with unlimited budget. To the best of our knowledge, this “padding” method leads to a class of mechanisms that are the first strategy-proof, individually rational, budget-balanced, and asymptotically efficient mechanisms for the specified exchange environment. Furthermore, these mechanisms dominate known truthful bundle/single-unit mechanisms with higher efficiency, lower buying prices, and higher selling prices.