Leasing, Lemons, and Buybacks
构建新车和二手车市场的竞争模型，分析新车租赁如何缓解逆向选择问题，并发现回购也能提高二手车市场效率，对研究汽车市场和信息不对称的学者有参考价值。
In his seminal article of 1970, Akerlof argued that the used-car market is not efficient because adverse selection causes too little trade. We construct a competitive model of the new- and used-car markets and investigate the relationship between new-car leasing and adverse selection. Our analysis yields a number of interesting results, including that new-car leasing reduces the adverse-selection problem, and that buybacks also increase efficiency in the secondhand market. We also discuss alternative explanations for new-car leasing and an explanation for the growth in new-car leasing during the last fifteen years. Copyright 2003 by the RAND Corporation.