Information, Incentives, and Organizational Mode
研究两阶段生产过程中，当各阶段成本信息仅被生产方观察时，委托人如何选择组织模式。成本正相关时委托人偏好自己完成第二阶段；负相关且足够小时偏好由同一代理人完成两阶段；负相关很大时两种模式都可能；不相关时无差异。
We examine the choice of organizational mode for a two-stage production process wherein cost realizations at each stage are observed only by the producing party. When these costs are positively correlated, the principal prefers to undertake second-stage production herself. When the correlation is negative and sufficiently small, she will prefer that the agent who performs the first stage also perform the second. For large negative correlation, either mode might be preferred. When costs are uncorrelated, the principal is indifferent between modes.