Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution
研究不同财政宪法（即各级政府财政工具分配及集体选择程序）如何影响地区间公共转移，揭示风险分担与再分配之间的权衡，并比较投票选择的联邦社会保险与谈判选择的政府间转移方案的不同结果。
This paper studies the political and economic determinants of regional public transfers. Specifically, it focuses on how such transfers are shaped by alternative fiscal constitutions, where a constitution is an allocation of fiscal instruments across different levels of governments plus a procedure for the collective choice of these instruments. Realistic restrictions on fiscal instruments introduce a trade-off between risk sharing and redistribution. Different constitutions produce very different results. In particular, a federal social insurance scheme, chosen by voting, provides overinsurance, whereas an intergovernmental transfer scheme, chosen by bargaining, provides underinsurance. Copyright 1996 by University of Chicago Press.