A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States
分析一个随机匿名配对讨价还价的市场，买卖双方对商品价值信息不对称，且市场开放后无新进入者。研究发现均衡中信息揭示和效率永远无法实现，即使贴现消失，部分情况下大量商品无法交易，这与基于稳态的早期文献形成对比。
We analyse a market where (i) trade proceeds by random and anonymous pairwise meetings with bargaining; (ii) agents are asymmetrically informed about the value of the traded good; and (iii) no new entrants are allowed once the market is open. We show that information revelation and efficiency never obtain in equilibrium, even as discounting is removed. This holds whether the asymmetry is two-sided or one-sided. In some cases there exist equilibria where a substantial amount goes untraded. This contrasts with the earlier literature, which was based on the steadystate equilibria of a model where agents enter the market every period.