Integrator Contracts with Many Agents and Bankruptcy
分析整合公司与众多独立养殖户之间的最优合同，解释肉鸡、火鸡和生猪行业为何同时存在不同的激励方案，关键在于产出价格波动和企业规模影响破产风险。
Abstract This article analyzes optimal livestock production contracts between an integrator company and many independent growers in three similar industries: broiler, turkey, and swine. The analysis provides an explanation for the simultaneous existence of distinct incentive schemes in these industries by examining the effects of bankruptcy. The key factors are shown to be the output price volatility and the firm size. With large companies dominating the broiler industry, a small price volatility facilitates the use of two‐part piece rate tournaments. By contrast, given the prevalence of smaller companies in the swine industry, a larger price volatility generates a bankruptcy risk which renders the use of tournaments infeasible. Given the combination of medium‐size companies in the turkey industry, an intermediate price volatility produces a mixed result where tournaments and fixed performance standards exist simultaneously.