Attracting Attention: Cheap Managerial Talk and Costly Market Monitoring
提出一个理论，解释管理层与资本市场之间的非正式沟通（廉价言论）如何影响股东价值，并分析管理层言论的可信度与股票薪酬、知情交易和股票流动性的关系。
ABSTRACT We provide a theory of informal communication—cheap talk—between firms and capital markets that incorporates the role of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The analysis suggests that a policy of discretionary disclosure that encourages managers to attract the market's attention when the firm is substantially undervalued can create shareholder value. The theory also relates the credibility of managerial announcements to the use of stock‐based compensation, the presence of informed trading, and the liquidity of the stock. Our results are consistent with the existence of positive announcement effects produced by apparently innocuous corporate events (e.g., stock dividends, name changes).