Former Audit Partners and Abnormal Accruals
研究发现，聘用现任审计师的前合伙人担任高管或董事的公司，其异常应计利润显著高于其他公司，且更可能刚好达到分析师盈利预测，表明“旋转门”做法可能损害审计独立性。
Audit clients often employ a former partner of their present auditor as an officer or a director. This “revolving door” practice presents a potential threat to auditor independence. Using the Jones (1991) model to calculate abnormal accruals for firms in 1998 and 1999, we find that firms employing former partners as officers or directors report larger signed and unsigned abnormal accruals than other firms, after controlling for other factors that plausibly affect abnormal accruals. To ensure that the results are not driven by performance characteristics of the former partner firms, we construct a performance-matched control sample and obtain consistent results. We also observe a disproportionately higher (lower) proportion of former partner firms than expected just meeting (missing) analysts' earnings forecasts.