Incentive-Compatible Long-Term Contracts and Job Rationing
构建了一个模型，其中长期合同劳动力市场与临时劳动力市场并存。在缺乏第三方执行的情况下，工资合同需满足激励相容条件，导致合同工资提供的预期效用高于临时市场工资，从而在均衡中长期合同工作被配给。
This article presents a model in which markets for long-term contractual employment coexist with spot markets for labor. Assuming the absence of third-party enforcement, wage contracts are required to be incentive compatible. As a consequence, contract wages yield higher expected utility to the worker than spot-market wages so that, in equilibrium, contractual long-term jobs are rationed. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.