Equilibrium, Price Formation, and the Value of Private Information
分析了一个经济，其中代理人先选择是否获取关于风险资产回报的昂贵信息，再选择决定资产配置的需求函数。研究表明，若明确建模价格形成过程且代理人不作为价格接受者，则存在完全揭示价格与昂贵信息获取的均衡。
An economy is analyzed in which agents first choose whether to acquire costly information about the return to a risky asset, and then choose demand functions that determine the allocation of assets. It is a well-known paradox that if agents are price-takers and prices are fully revealing, then an equilibrium with costly information acquisition does not exist. It is shown that if the price formation process is modeled explicitly and agents are not price-takers, then it is possible to have an equilibrium with fully revealing prices and costly information acquisition.