Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice
总结了制造商与独家经销商之间合同关系的实证规律，包括特许经营和销售团队整合研究，发现部分规律与标准激励保险理论一致，部分不符，并回顾了调和理论与实践的扩展理论。
We summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers. We do this using studies of traditional and business‐format‐franchise relationships, as well as studies of sales‐force‐integration decisions. Some of the patterns that we uncover are consistent with a standard incentive‐cum‐insurance theory of organization, while others are not. We briefly review some theoretical extensions that seem promising in terms of reconciling seeming conflicts between theory and practice.