合谋与拍卖方式的选择

Collusion and the Choice of Auction

RAND Journal of Economics · 1985
被引 289
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

证明,在公开增价拍卖中卡特尔稳定,而在密封高价拍卖中不稳定,这解释了政府为何常用密封拍卖。

Abstract

Auctions are used in many different markets, including the leasing of a substantial fraction of the natural resources in the United States. The procedures used in the auctions conducted by the federal government have been a continuing source of controversy. One of the concerns has been the possibility of collusion among bidders. This article shows that cartels are stable if the seller uses open ascending-bid (oral) auctions, but not if he uses sealed high-bid auctions. This may help to explain the frequent use of sealed high-bid auctions.

合谋拍卖形式选择公开增价拍卖密封高价拍卖