On the Dampening-of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing
比较了独家交易、共用零售商和纵向一体化三种销售安排下的利润与福利影响，发现不完全竞争制造商偏好独家交易，且其福利高于共用零售商，为1949年标准加油站反垄断案提供了新解释。
The authors compare and contrast the profit and welfare effects of exclusive dealing, sales through a common retailer, and vertical integration. As did Y. J. Lin (1990), the authors find that imperfectly competitive manufacturers prefer to impose exclusive dealing on their retailers. Unlike Lin, the authors find that welfare is higher under exclusive dealing than when products are sold through a common retailer. This finding suggests a new interpretation of the Standard Stations v. United States 1949 antitrust case. Copyright 1993 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.