Accounting Choices and Director Interlocks: A Social Network Approach to the Voluntary Expensing of Stock Option Grants
从社会网络视角研究企业自愿费用化股票期权的影响因素，发现董事关联网络中的社会影响和学习效应会促使企业模仿其他关联企业的做法，且与曾被指控财务报告欺诈的机构投资者有关联的企业更可能采取该做法。
Abstract: We adopt a social network perspective of accounting choices and argue that voluntary expensing of stock option grants by firms may be driven by social influence and learning within a network of director interlocks. We find that firms are more likely to expense stock option grants voluntarily when they have inside director interlocks with (1) other firms that do likewise, and (2) institutional investors of firms accused of financial reporting fraud. This study contributes to extant research by highlighting that a social network approach complements a cost‐and‐benefit approach (or an economic perspective) when examining the accounting practices of firms.