Public Debt Guarantees and Private Capital Flight
研究了发展中国家政府对外债的隐性或显性担保如何导致私人资本外逃，并可能引发债务违约，对理解债务危机有参考价值。
Significant amounts of private capital have flowed out of several of the more heavily indebted developing countries. This outflow, often called "capital flight," largely escapes taxation by the borrowing-country government, and has generated concern about the prospects for future servicing of the debt. Imperfect contract enforcement may lead to implicit or explicit government guarantee of foreign debt. The model developed below demonstrates that a government policy of guaranteeing private debt can, in turn, generate more than one outcome. One such outcome replicates the allocation under perfect contract enforcement: national savings is invested domestically and foreign debt is repaid. The tax obligation implied by potential nationalization of private debt, however, can also lead to another outcome in which national capital flees and foreign debt may not be repaid.