Search in a Known Pattern
研究买家（如求职者）在已知顺序中搜索卖家（如加油站）的市场，双方策略互动且信息不完全，通过不完全信息博弈刻画均衡，发现价格在搜索过程中不一定单调变化。
In this paper a market where a buyer (job seeker) is searching in a known order among sellers (e.g., a motorist driving along a road looking for gasoline) is described. Both sellers and buyers are assumed to behave strategically. There are many types of buyers. The sellers know only the distribution of all possible buyers; similarly, buyers have imperfect information about sellers. The analysis is conducted by modeling the market as a game with incomplete information; the equilibrium is characterized. A central feature of the game is that both buyers and sellers rationally update their prior information about each other as the game unfolds sequentially. It is shown that prices need not vary monotonically along the search process.