Informational Externalities in Settlement Bargaining: Confidentiality and Correlated Culpability
研究多个原告因同一被告行为受害时，早期诉讼的信息会帮助后续原告判断被告责任，同时早期原告可通过保密和解向被告收取信息控制费用。
We explore informational externalities that arise when multiple plaintiffs are harmed by the behavior or product of a single defendant. An early plaintiff is likely to raise the awareness of a later plaintiff, and the later plaintiff will be able to learn something about the defendant's culpability by observing the disposition of the early suit: the presence of an early plaintiff provides a benefit to a later plaintiff. The presence of the later plaintiff also confers a potential benefit on the early plaintiff: the early plaintiff has the opportunity to charge the defendant for controlling the flow of information (e.g., through confidential settlement).