Multiunit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries
构建了一个工会化寡头行业的工资决定模型，比较了企业层面独立工会谈判与行业层面全国工会谈判的结果，发现行业谈判导致更高工资且具有内在稳定性。
A model of wage determination in unionized oligopolistic industries is developed and used to compare the outcome of collective bargaining under two different bargaining structures-one in which the workers of each firm are represented by separate and independent unions (local bargaining) and one in which a national union represents all workers in the industry. In both cases, the bargaining problem has a unique outcome with industrywide bargaining resulting in higher wages. In addition, industrywide unions are inherently stable in that there are no incentives for independent unions to attempt to cheat on the collusive agreement. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.