Managerial Discretion Costs and the Acquisition of Capital: Evidence from Forced Warrant Exercise
研究发现，强制权证行权公告日公司股价出现负异常回报，尤其在低杠杆、低效率且可能推迟行权的公司中更显著，表明管理层自由裁量权的代理成本是重要因素。
Forced warrant exercise should elicit a stock price reaction only in response to inventory adjustments or unanticipated increases in agency costs. We find evidence of both effects. Firms calling warrants for redemption experience negative abnormal returns on the announcement date. Negative returns are concentrated among firms whose characteristics suggest that the call should have been deferred. We find lower announcement returns among inefficient firms with low leverage-firms for which the agency costs of managerial discretion may be high. All else equal, announcement returns are lower among inefficient firms that invested heavily in the year after forced exercise.