Examining the link between price regulation and pharmaceutical R&D investment
利用美国药品市场相对不受价格管制的事实，通过准结构方程模型模拟美国实施价格管制政策对制药研发投资的影响，发现研发投资将下降23.4%至32.7%，并讨论了社会福利含义。
This paper examines the link between price regulation and pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) investment. I identify two mechanisms through which price regulation may exert an influence on R&D: an expected-profit effect and a cash-flow effect. Using established models of the determinants of pharmaceutical R&D, I exploit a unique fact to quantify firm exposure to pharmaceutical price regulation: relative to the rest of the world, the U.S. pharmaceutical market is largely unregulated with respect to price. Using this fact within the context of a system of quasi-structural equations, I simulate how a new policy regulating pharmaceutical prices in the U.S. will affect R&D investment. I find that such a policy will lead to a decline in industry R&D by between 23.4 and 32.7%. This prediction, however, is accompanied by several caveats. Moreover, it says nothing about the implications for social welfare; therefore, these issues are also discussed.