Overconfidence in the Markets for Lemons
研究了当部分买家过度自信时，他们忽视信号噪声、高估信号准确性，这能防止市场完全崩溃，但会挤走理性买家。
Abstract We extend Akerlof's “Market for Lemons” (1970, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 , 488–500) by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is on display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes' rule but take the noisy signal at face value. We show that the presence of overconfident buyers can stabilize the market outcome by preventing total adverse selection. However, this stabilization comes at a cost: rational buyers are crowded out of the market.