Manipulation via Withholding: A Generalization
推广了Postlewaite和Thomson的经典结论，证明任何帕累托最优的分配机制都存在隐瞒问题，无论是否满足个体理性，也无论隐瞒的束能否完全或部分恢复。
Postlewaite (1979) and Thomson (1987) showed that every individually-rational and Pareto-optimal allocation mechanism is subject to the problem of withholding with full recovery (Postlewaite) or partial recovery (Thomson). We generalize these results and show that the assumption of individual rationality can be disposed of in both results: the problem of withholding is present for any allocation mechanism in the class of Pareto-optimal mechanisms, whether it is individually rational or not, and whether agents are able to recover the withheld bundle fully or only partially.