VOTING, INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION
综述了关于再分配投票的模型，探讨了不平等如何影响再分配政策，并分析了不同经济假设下结论的变化，适合研究收入分配与公共政策的学者快速了解该领域核心观点。
Abstract This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner. If the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor, and increasing inequality increases redistribution. However, under different assumptions about the economic environment, redistribution may not be simply rich to poor, and inequality need not increase redistribution. Several lines of argument are presented, in particular, political participation, public provision of private goods, public pensions, and tax avoidance or evasion.