Capital Structure as an Optimal Contract Between Employees and Investors
从内生角度推导了投资者与员工之间的最优契约，并将其解释为债务、股权和员工薪酬的组合。模型解释了为何需要债务来推动价值提升的重组，以及为何员工债权通常优先于投资者。
ABSTRACT The ex ante optimal contract between investors and employees is derived endogenously and is interpreted in terms of debt, equity, and employees' compensation. Although public equity financing is feasible in this model through verified accounting income, debt is needed to force value‐enhancing restructuring before the income realizes. The optimal debt level, however, is lower than that which maximizes the value of the firm when there is nonmonetary restructuring‐related cost to employees. The paper explains how stock prices react to exchange offers, how earnings can be diluted by a decrease in leverage, and why employees' claims are generally senior to those of investors. New testable implications about leverage and compensation levels are derived.