Measuring the Multilateral Allocation of Rents: Wyoming Low-Sulfur Coal
开发了一个计量经济学方法，用于衡量任何市场结构下买卖双方获得的租金，并应用于怀俄明州低硫煤行业，发现铁路和煤炭生产商各占约23%的潜在租金，州政府和购买公用事业分别占7%和47%，且1980年放松管制后租金向铁路转移。
This article develops a general econometric procedure for determining the amount of rent captured by buyers and sellers of goods produced under any market structure. We use this technique to measure the rents earned by firms involved in the extraction, transportation, and consumption of low-sulfur Wyoming coal. Statistical results indicate that railroads and coal producers each capture about 23% of potential rent, while the state and purchasing utilities capture 7% and 47%, respectively. Further, statistical tests support the hypothesis that rents have shifted towards the railroads since their deregulation in 1980. We also examine the extent of discriminatory pricing by relating the percentage markups of price over estimated marginal cost to the demand elasticity for coal. We find evidence of price discrimination by coal producers and railroads, but the degree of price discrimination exercised by coal producers declines with more recent contracts.