Banks' changing incentives and opportunities for risk taking
研究了1980年代银行业风险控制体系恶化现象，发现高特许价值银行始终自我约束风险，而低特许价值银行从1983年起显著增加风险承担，持续至1990年代初。
This paper investigates the deterioration of the banking industry's risk-control system during the 1980s and the time-varying relation between a bank's ex-ante risk-taking incentives and its ex-post risk-taking behavior over the period 1977–1994. We document that banks with high charter value imposed self-discipline on risk-taking behavior at all times. In contrast, banks with low charter value assumed significantly more risk beginning around 1983, and this behavior continued into the early 1990s. These findings have several important policy implications.